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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

ROBERT KELTON BERRY,

:

v.

Defendant/Appellant

Case No. 20040142-CA

:

POINT I. THE SECOND ELEMENT OF THE ROBERTSON TEST
SURVIVED THE UTAH SUPREME COURTS REASONABLE DOUBT LINE
OF CASES.
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the Utah Supreme Court did not
overrule the second element of the Robertson test that states a reasonable doubt definition
"should not state that a reasonable doubt is one which 'would govern or control a person
in the more weighty affairs of life/ as such an instruction tends to trivialize the decision
of whether to convict." Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (quoting State v. Ireland, 773
P.2d 1375, 1380-82 (Stewart, J., dissent)). The continued validity of the second element
of the Robertson test is evident from the third of the Utah Supreme Court's reasonable
doubt cases, State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49. In Weaver, the Court clarified that Reyes
"overruled the Robertson test mandating that a reasonable doubt instruction specifically
require the state to 'obviate all reasonable doubt.'" Weaver, 2005 UT 49 at ^7 (quoting
Reyes, 2005 UT 33, p o , 116 P.3d 305. The Supreme Court overruled this element
because "it tends to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict and in that respect

violates the Victor standard." Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 1J27. Unlike the first element of the
Robertson test, the second element remains valid after Reyes because it, as required by
the Victor test, ensures the reasonable doubt definition given to the jury does not "tend[]
to diminish the degree of proof necessary to convict" the defendant. Reyes, 2005 UT 33
at 127.
In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the United States Supreme Court said the
"government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense."
Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994) (citation omitted). "The beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is a requirement of due process." Id A definition of reasonable doubt
violates the due process clause if, '"taken as a whole,'" "there is a reasonable likelihood
that the jury understood the [definition of reasonable doubt] to allow conviction based on
proof insufficient to meet the Winship standard." Id. at 6 (citation omitted). For
example, in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam), the trial court defined
reasonable doubt as "a grave uncertainty" or "an actual substantial doubt" that prevents
the jury from reaching a "moral certainty." Cage, 498 U.S. at 40. The Supreme Court
held the instruction was unconstitutional because "a reasonable juror could have
interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based on a degree of proof below
that required by the Due Process Clause." Id. at 41.
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, Justice Stewart's Ireland dissent, which
ultimately produced the Robertson test, discussed how comparing the reasonable doubt
standard to major life decisions "tends to diminish and trivialize the constitutionally
required burden-of-proof standard." Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1381; Appellant Supp. Brief 82

9. These same concerns were expressed by Justice Ginsburg in urging the adoption of the
Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Criminal Instruction for reasonable doubt. See Victor,
511 U.S. at 24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Appellant Supp. Brief 9-10.
In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), the Supreme Court briefly
addressed a jury instruction that defined reasonable doubt "as 'the kind of doubt. . .
which you folks in the more serious and important affairs of your own lives might be
willing to act upon.'" Id at 140. The Court held there was no prejudicial error because,
"taken as a whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to
the jury." Id It noted, however, that:
We think this section of the charge should have been in terms of the kind of
doubt that would make a person hesitate to act, rather than the kind on
which he would be willing to act. But we believe that the instruction as
given was not the type that could mislead the jury into finding no
reasonable doubt when in fact there was some. A definition of a doubt as
something the jury would act upon would seem to create confusion rather
than misapprehension.
Id. (internal citation omitted). Several jurisdictions have interpreted Holland to draw a
distinction between "hesitate to act" and "willingness to act" and to uphold use of the
"hesitate to act" language. See, e.g., United States v. Tobin, 576 F.2d 687, 694 (5th Cir.
1978); Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 2000), cert, denied, 531 U.S.
1055 (2000). This interpretation, however, is unlikely:
The Court's problem seems to have been not with the willingness to act
phrasing itself, but instead with the definition of doubt as something people
would act upon. The instruction should have either defined proof beyond a
reasonable doubt as the kind of certainty people would act upon or, as the
Court suggested, defined reasonable doubt as the kind of doubt that would
undermine a person's willingness to act.
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That the Court was concerned with the instruction's nonsensical phrasing
rather than the quantum of doubt described thereby is suggested by its
observation that "[a] definition of doubt as something the jury would act
upon would seem to create confusion rather than misapprehension."
Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209, 1214 n.8 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)
(emphases in original), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998); see Victor, 511 U.S. at 24-25
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (criticizing "hesitate to act" language without referencing
Holland); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 20 n.5 (1 st Cir. 1982) (noting "[s]ome
courts appear to have misunderstood" Holland, where the instruction at issue was
"manifestly wrong as it turn[ed] the reasonable doubt standard on its head").
In this case, the distinction between "willingness to act" and "hesitate to act" is
immaterial because defense counsel used the "willingness to act" language when
comparing reasonable doubt to major life decisions. R. 267:294 (defense counsel
defining proof beyond a reasonable doubt in the following way "And I have talked about
how serious these offenses are, and how important, if not more important, than deciding
who you are going to marry or if you are going to buy a house. That's how careful you
have to be and what factors you would weigh in saying, 'Am I going to marry this
person?'") R. 267:294.
Other jurisdictions agree "there is a substantial difference between a juror's
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and a person making a judgment in a matter of
personal importance to him." Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 883 (1967); see, e.g., United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15,
20 (1 st Cir. 1982) (noting that "comparing the reasonable doubt standard with the process
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employed by a juror in making important decisions in his or her own life" has potential
"for impermissibly reducing the government's burden of proof'); United States v.
Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding "most important decisions
in life—choosing a spouse, buying a house, borrowing money, and the like—may involve
a heavy element of uncertainty and risk-taking and are wholly unlike the decisions jurors
ought to make in criminal cases"); Commonwealth v. Rembiszewski, 461 N.E.2d 201,
204-09 & n.l (Mass. 1984) (finding error based on instruction including comparisons to
decisions regarding professions, marriage, home, and surgery); Commonwealth v.
Ferreira, 364 N.E.2d 1264, 1273 (Mass. 1977) (holding "degree of certainty required to
convict is unique to the criminal law" and people do not "customarily make private
decisions according to this standard").
As argued in Appellant's Supplemental Brief, Robertson's prohibition against
defining reasonable doubt by analogizing it to major life decisions remains good law.
See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1232. Therefore, by violating this prohibition, defense
counsel's performance fell "below an objective standard of reasonableness." State v.
Montova, 2004 UT 5, ^[23, 84 P.3d 1183. Given the well-established case law that the
use of these types of analogies tends to diminish the standard of proof necessary to
convict, defense counsel's comparisons cannot be considered sound trial strategy and
prejudiced Mr. Berry because there was a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome
had defense counsel not lowered the State's burden of proof by misstating the reasonable
doubt standard. Thus, defense counsel's performance meets the Strickland test. See
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984).
5
I

POINT II. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR THE COACHING OF THE
PROSECUTION'S ONLY WITNESS TO THE EVENTS TO BE EXCLUDED FROM
THE JURYS CONSIDERATION OF CREDIBILITY.
"[A] number of state courts have held that coaching is a matter which bears upon a
witness' credibility[.]" State v. Rodriguez, 509 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Neb. 1993). Therefore,
"the question of coaching is one for the jury." Id. Utah has also determined that "[i]t is
for the factfinder to determine witness credibility." State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094,
1096 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993); see
also Gillespie v. Southern Utah State College, 669 P.2d 861 (1983) ("It is the exclusive
province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses . .. ."). Indeed, recently
in Tillman v. State, 2005 UT 56, where transcript evidence of coaching of one of the
state's witnesses had not been disclosed to defendant, the Utah Supreme Court
determined that had the transcripts been disclosed the defendant may have been able to
use them to "raise[] questions in the minds of the jurors as to the overall veracity or
credibility of [the witness'] account." Id. at ^|67. Therefore, the trial court's error in
excluding the coaching of the state's key witness from the jury consideration of
credibility was prejudicial.
When the trial court instructed the jury that they could not consider the coaching
of the state's key witness, it "usurp[ed] the fact-finding function of [the] . .. jury."
Stafaniak, 900 P.2d at 1096) (citation omitted). In giving the jury a curative instruction,
"our judicial system greatly relies upon the jury's integrity to uphold the jury oath,
including its promise to follow all of the judge's instructions." State v. Harmon, 956
P.2d 262, 272 (Utah 1998) (emphasis in original). Hence, it must be presumed that the
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jury followed the trial court's instruction limiting their ability to determine the effect
Brandon's mother's coaching had on Brandon's credibility.
As argued in Appellant's Opening Brief, the judge's error was prejudicial because
Brandon's credibility, perceptions, and memory provided the only evidence supporting
guilt. Appellant's Opening Brief 50. This was a close case where Brandon's testimony
was inconsistent regarding many aspects of what took place making Mr. Berry's
involvement in the offense suspect. Appellant's Opening Brief 34-40; Appellant Supp.
Brief 11-14. Given that Brandon's testimony was the only evidence supporting Mr.
Berry's guilt, the trial court's erroneous jury instruction usurping the jury's ability to
consider the coaching of his testimony was "sufficiently prejudicial that there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its absence." Seel v.
Van Per Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998).
CONCLUSION
As set forth more fully in the opening and supplemental brief, Appellant, Robert
Kelton Berry, respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction and remand for a
new trial.
SUBMITTED this __3_ day of November, 2005.
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